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Reconciling Conflicting Identities:                     
How National and Religious Identities Influence 
the Decision to Marry in Egypt 
Courtney P. Erwin1 
  
Karim and Layla2 met at the American University in Cairo (AUC) and 
dated for three years.  During those three years, they experienced the usual 
ups and downs of a young relationship.  Both Karim and Layla also 
struggled with the implacable problem of falling for the fundamentally 
“wrong” person: Karim is a Muslim, and Layla is a Copt.3  Karim and Layla 
knew that their relationship dangerously navigated around hostile 
boundaries.  After too many familial battles, the Coptic boy and the Muslim 
girl resigned themselves to the inevitable and broke up.  After all, a future 
together was nearly impossible—where would they get married, and who 
would marry them?  No one in Egypt would challenge the explicit religious 
prohibitions against interfaith marriage,4 much less compromise one’s own 
convictions concerning such an illicit union.  Nor would the Egyptian 
government offer Karim and Layla protection against discriminatory 
religious postures, the government having implemented legislation 
relegating family law, including marriage, to one’s individual religion.5  
Had they decided to stay together and to marry outside Egypt, Karim and 
Layla would have lost their friends and families and would have faced legal 
complications within Egypt.6   
While friendships between the Muslim majority and Coptic minority 
populations are accepted in Egypt, romantic relations crossing the religious 
divide are not.  Religious identification is a large part of the dynamic 
between today’s Egyptian Muslims and Copts.  This religious identification 
legitimizes discrimination by each religion against the other in order to 
protect the religious legacy of both groups.  The legal and socioreligious 
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culture prohibiting interfaith marriage confirms the quandary facing 
contemporary Egyptians, which is to either defend the survival of one’s 
culture and religion by marrying within the same faith, or to reinterpret 
one’s culture and religion so that it reflects modern ideals of religious 
freedom and equality, including the right to marry whomever one loves.    
Allowing Coptic-Muslim unions could result in homogenization that 
would cause damage to cultural and religious diversity and lead to the 
gradual disappearance of centuries-old tradition.  Even so, current methods 
of preserving religious identities are weathering an antagonistic onslaught 
from the international human rights arena and causing a slow loss of 
legitimacy among the religions’ own adherents.  The once incontestable 
social condemnation against interfaith relationships is slowly beginning to 
suffer small cracks in its construction.  Neither Layla’s nor Karim’s parents 
would ever have considered dating someone outside their respective 
religions, but Layla and Karim developed a romantic relationship despite 
knowing that they would never marry.  This progression is a small but 
significant step in today’s Egyptian society.     
In this article, I analyze the conflict between Egypt’s Copts and 
Muslims.7  More specifically, I examine the conflict between their religious 
identities in relation to the national identity of modern Egyptians in a 
globalized society.  Both religious identities promote discrimination based 
on religion while the national identity of modern Egyptians promotes 
religious tolerance and freedom from discrimination.  In order to reconcile 
the religious identities of the Copts and Muslims with the national identity 
of Egypt, the religious identity must reform.  Any substantive change in the 
area of marriage in Egypt must occur through a process of religious 
introspection.  For Egyptian society to accept the marriage of Layla and 
Karim, Copts and Muslims need to transform their religious identities, but 
the Egyptian government and the national legal system cannot create this 
change alone. 
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In Part I, I present the three identities at issue: Coptic, Muslim, and the 
Egyptian national identity and examine what happens when they intersect.  
In Part II, I explore the areas of conflict expressed in the Egyptian legal 
arena and compare the Egyptian laws pertaining to non-Muslim–Muslim 
relationships with the international human rights standards protecting 
freedom of religion and religious minorities.  Finally, in Part III, I confront 
the possibility of reconciling this conflict and propose that religious 
transformation precede, or guide, legal activism. 
I.  RELIGIOUS VERSUS NATIONAL IDENTITIES 
In Egypt, modern notions of equality, religious tolerance, and non-
discrimination collide with the preservation of religious norms and 
restrictions.  This collision occurs at the crossroads of identities.  In order to 
respond to this conflict, it is necessary to understand these identities; 
specifically, the Coptic and Muslim identities and the national, Egyptian 
identity.  The latter is created by the Egyptian legal and political structure, 
which is guided by an overarching international configuration advocating a 
universal human rights model.    
A.  Religious Identities 
The relationship between the Copts and the Muslims in Egypt is built 
upon centuries of interaction, isolation, comity, and conflict.  At times, the 
relationship has been tenuous and uneasy, but it has also been courteous and 
calm.  The most patent features of the historical interface are the carefully 
fashioned contours of the respective religious identities and the boundaries 
erected around those identities.  Since the Islamic invasion of Egypt in AD 
640, Muslims have enjoyed the status of the Egyptian majority, wielding 
political, economic, and social dominance.8  The Copts, on the other hand, 
have lived as a religious minority within Egypt since the founding of the 
Coptic Church in Alexandria in AD 55.9  As a religious minority, the Copts 
have suffered from an assortment of discriminatory practices, committed 
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both officially by the Egyptian government and informally by Egyptian 
society.10   
This history of Coptic-Muslim interaction is most commonly studied and 
discussed with respect to the impact of religious discrimination on political 
rights,11 minority protection,12 and religious freedom.13  These studies and 
discussions tend to give clarity to the greater international human rights 
discourse on discrimination, in which the granting or denying of political 
power based on one’s religion is often unmistakable.  However, I am 
interested in the ambiguous areas of Muslim-Coptic discrimination, in 
which the lines of demarcation are not so clear and are, in fact, difficult to 
address.  The subject of marriage occupies this realm of ambiguity. 
Marriage presents a rich study in the complex and changing disposition 
of religious identities and how these Muslim and Coptic identities affect 
national identity and religious discrimination in Egypt.  An awareness of the 
discriminatory practices of Muslims and Copts in the area of marriage will 
add another, perhaps illuminating, perspective to the human rights 
discussion around religious discrimination.  Additionally, this perspective 
might be useful to those who are struggling to effectively understand and 
address the global occurrence of religious discrimination in local societies. 
1.  Muslim Identity 
The religion of Islam occupies a central role in the lives of Muslims, like 
Karim, in Egypt.  The centrality of Islam can be credited, in part, to a 
genuine belief and adherence to its religious dictates, while part of Islam’s 
influence is attributable to tradition and socioreligious pressure.  The former 
dimension—that of personal and private devotion to religious dictates—is 
demonstrated by the observance of prayer (five times daily) and the month-
long fast (Ramadan).14  Conversely, the Egyptian law that requires each 
individual to carry an identity card that clearly declares one’s religion15 
illustrates the manifestation of the socioreligious demands.  Egyptians 
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confirm their religious affiliation every time they present their identity card, 
which is regularly.16   
The relationship between religion and law is one of the most powerful 
relationships in Islam.  Religious identity and legal identity are inextricably 
bound: religion provides the system of belief, and law, necessarily 
presupposing this belief, conducts and regulates every movement of the 
believer.17  Although Islamic law—Shari‘a in Arabic—is not the law in 
Egypt today,18 it is a persistent and pervasive presence in the life of modern-
day Muslims.19  Accordingly, the religious identity of Egyptian Muslims 
cannot be divorced from the authority of the Shari‘a.20   
Perhaps the most compelling aspect of the legal component of Islam is its 
unique brand of legitimacy: the Shari‘a is dependent upon a transcendental 
authority.21  Both the religious and legal dictates spring forth from the 
Qur’an, which Muslims believe is the literal word of God.22  While the 
Qur’an contains certain explicit dictates that require little or no 
interpretation, jurists trained in legal methodology must extract much of the 
law from the text.23  While there is a vibrant element of human interaction 
in the mining of divine legal rules, the idea that God reveals the law 
presents a formidable barrier to any other legal (or belief/value) system 
wholly created through human effort (i.e., not God-centered) that intends to 
supercede the Shari‘a. 
The Shari‘a and its legal formulations governing non-Muslim–Muslim 
affairs are largely responsible for fashioning the Muslim perceptions of 
minorities.  Consequently, this view of minorities is firmly incorporated 
into the Muslim identity.  Arising from this view and its importance in 
Muslim identity is the role that Muslims assume in the contemporary 
dynamic between Copts and Muslims.  As Sudanese Islamic law and human 
rights scholar Abdullahi an-Na‘im asserts, “Non-Muslim minorities within 
an Islamic state do not enjoy rights equal to those of the Muslim 
majority.”24   
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While the Shari‘a guarantees minorities many rights,25 the minority 
communities retain those rights only if they submit to Muslim 
sovereignty.26  A number of restrictions accompany the afforded rights.27  
The relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims, which operates under 
cover of religious legitimacy, results in an inherently discriminatory 
imbalance.  The unequal Muslim-Copt relationship is typified by the 
dominance of the Muslim majority28 and is maintained because Muslims 
believe that their own religious law authorizes such dominance.29  To tinker 
in this area of relational inequities is to compromise an entrenched legal-
religious identity. 
2.  Coptic Identity 
The identity of Copts, like Layla for example, is shaped around their 
minority status.  Living as Christians in a country where religion is the 
determinative feature of life has had a marked impact on Coptic identity.  
Even though Muslims have always tolerated Copts, Copts perceive their 
history in Muslim Egypt as one of persecution.30  Even during more placid 
periods, Copts were never divested of their badge of inferiority and were 
always subject to the restrictions placed upon them by the Muslim majority.  
Copts developed a sense of resentment and distrust because of systematic 
and ingrained discrimination.31  This is a resentment that is reinforced today 
by the fact that many restrictions have never been abandoned32 and that 
persecution continues by Egyptian officials33 and individuals.34 
Historically, one of the “rights” afforded to minorities—known as 
dhimmis—under the Shari‘a was internal autonomy.35  This autonomy was 
premised upon a separation of the communities by religion.  Accordingly, 
the Copts, who were the dhimmis in Egypt, enjoyed a degree of internal 
community autonomy to conduct their personal and private affairs in 
accordance with their religious law and customs.36  Because the worldview 
of Muslims was, and continues to be, premised upon rigid religious 
demarcations, as long as the Copts submitted publicly to Islamic political 
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rule, the Muslims were not inclined to impose their religion privately upon 
religious minorities.  To the Muslims, it would make little sense to insist 
upon a Copt’s adherence to Islamic direction.  In the domain of the purely 
religious, Muslims were, and are still, content not to interfere.   
The desire to separate the religions not only encouraged autonomy but 
also allowed Muslims to impose restrictions upon Copts.  The restrictions 
were to clearly define the boundaries between the two religious spheres; if 
the Muslim majority perceived the Christian minority to be publicly 
encroaching upon their domain, for example, by constructing new churches, 
the Copts were to desist in such activity.37  Conversely, because the Copts 
were in no way encroaching upon Muslim territory in the area of marriage, 
the Copts were free to dictate their own laws in areas untouched by Islamic 
law:38   
[I]n any situation where applicable Islamic law and any other 
religious law were in conflict, it was always Islamic law that was 
controlling.  The subordinate status of the non-Muslim 
communities meant that they were subject to Islamic law in matters 
where the interests of Muslims or the Muslim community were 
deemed to be affected.39  
In essence, Egypt advanced a sociolegal structure of religious separation 
that was not equal. 
This religious autonomy allowed for an insulated Coptic community to 
fundamentally ground itself in its religious identity.  Accordingly, Copts  in 
Egyptian society lived in separate areas and, while they were subject to the 
above-mentioned restrictions, they were allowed to determine their religious 
belief system and laws.40  As a result, Copts imposed boundaries between 
themselves and the greater Muslim majority to achieve distance from the 
oppressive majority whom they distrusted and disliked and to enjoy the 
freedom granted in their religious lives.41  What also resulted, however, was 
a discriminatory attitude initiated by Copts toward Muslims.  The Copts, in 
their preference for isolation from the Muslims, placed restrictions on their 
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own interaction with the Muslims because as the minority, they were not 
entitled to place restrictions upon the Muslims.42  The social, religious, and 
legal dividing line for the Copts was also premised upon religious affiliation 
and affected the Coptic-Muslim relations in a different but still 
discriminatory manner. 
In today’s Egypt, Copts cannot escape from the entrenched history of 
guarded and restricted interaction.  The modern era has increased and 
intensified Muslim-Coptic relations but has not been able to erase the 
mentality that drove the Copts into self-isolation in the first place.  While 
Copts now work with Muslims and count Muslims amongst their friends, 
the uneasy whisper of distrust has not completely disappeared.43  
Unfortunately, the Coptic hesitation to disengage from their voluntary 
segregation is enforced by Coptic-Muslim clashes, which are reminiscent of 
the past.44  The opportunities to change and move out of the traditional 
restraints are not entirely forthcoming.   
B.  National Identity 
Muslims and Copts hold two identities—one rooted in their religious 
beliefs and another centered on their unified national identity as 
Egyptians.45  This national identity attains its legitimacy through the 
“common allegiance to the nation as a basis for solidarity.”46  National 
identity erases any lines drawn to preserve the partition of religions.  In fact, 
religion no longer has the authority to regulate social interactions if it, in 
any way, contradicts the laws of Egypt.47  The religious identifiers of 
“Copt” and “Muslim” defer to the national identifier of “Egyptian.”   
By dimming religious identifiers, the national identity presents new 
challenges to the Coptic-Muslim interaction.48  The political organization 
and the human rights values that the nation-state engenders have shaped a 
national identity in Egypt that is, in many ways, incompatible with the 
religious identities of Egypt’s Muslim majority and Coptic minority.49  For 
instance, the nation-state construction disrupts the religious bifurcation of 
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society by assuming control of the law through governments that enact 
uniform national laws in codified form.50  The dislocation of the law from 
religious control presents a number of problems for Egyptian society and its 
religiously oriented and ordered populace.   
The history of interaction between Copts and Muslims, which was 
previously governed by religious laws and customs, must now contend with 
the intrusion of a legal system that presumes to dictate all aspects of their 
public, and to some extent, private lives but that is not constituted under 
religious criteria.  Through the conjunction of the state and the law, the state 
becomes the master regulator of society, directing everything from personal 
status to institutions.  Muslims and Copts now face a modern nation-state 
premised on “a legal system in which citizens have equal rights and 
obligations.”51   
Similarly, as a nation-state, Egypt is not only part of the international 
patchwork comprised of other nation-states but is also a willing participant 
in the evolving formation of a unified and collaborative international 
community.52  As part of its commitment to international participation, 
Egypt is expected and pressured to comply with the guiding moral authority 
of international human rights standards.53  Whether the specific directives of 
these international standards are binding or nonbinding, they “articulate 
general legal principles and approximate the sentiments of the international 
community.”54  The emergence of the nation of Egypt entitles its citizenry 
to a corpus of shared international values as well as formalized laws.55  
Egyptian citizens not only confront their new national identity but also the 
international influences and effects upon that national identity. 
C.   The Intersection of Identities 
Because national law has supplanted religious law in Egypt, both 
Muslims and Copts confront a restructuring of the sociolegal organization 
and intersection of identities, albeit in different ways.  Muslims must 
grapple with the reality of a secular national legal system trumping their 
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divinely ordained Shari‘a.56  Egyptian national law attempts to marginalize 
religion as a defining norm in politics and society and divests Muslims of 
their sanctioned legal dominance.  Copts, on the other hand, are embroiled 
in a different predicament.  While national law benefits them by disrupting 
the sociolegal inequities premised upon religious differences, it also 
threatens to crumble the pocket of seclusion that has become the 
comfortable home of Copts in Egypt.  Egypt’s national laws compromise 
the religious laws that have ordered Coptic relations with their Muslim 
neighbors.57  What remains for both Copts and Muslims alike is a choice 
provoked by the change in legal paradigms: nation versus religion. 
The influence and evolution of cultural norms further exacerbate the 
religion versus national dilemma.  In Egypt, Copts and Muslims behave 
according to the tradition that has developed around the religious 
disposition.58  Even in the absence of strict legal regulations, the two groups 
conform to parameters set by the Coptic and Muslim communities.59  Since 
the beginning of colonization and modernization in the nineteenth century, 
Egyptians have experienced the massive influence of external forces, 
including foreign and international principles of equality, religious 
tolerance, and cross-religious interaction.60  Egyptians have traveled beyond 
their borders and have lived in societies in which national laws and the 
values that they promote are not plagued by a battle with religion.  The 
burgeoning consciousness that is born out of the amplification of external 
association is an uneasy blend of tradition and modernity. 
II.  MARRIAGE—INTERSECTION AND CONFLICT 
In Egypt, the legal, national, cultural, and religious spheres all converge 
at marriage.  At its most basic, marriage is a defender of identity, and in 
Egypt, one’s identity is one’s religion.  Those who marry within the 
religious community promise to abide by the tradition and culture of that 
community; there are no introductions of foreign beliefs that could 
influence the next generation to promote unfamiliar ideas about religion.61  
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Therefore, in Egypt, where religious identities abut each other, culture and 
certain laws clearly define marriage for the respective religious groups and 
protect the religious identities from threat of dilution.   Any change to this 
structure surrounding marriage compromises the religious identities of both 
commingling groups.  If Muslims and Copts redefine their traditional 
understandings of marriage, they must also reform their religions. 
A.  Ambiguities of Tolerance 
When there is a call for religious tolerance, which would potentially 
collapse certain inequitable distinctions, Muslims and Copts alike balk:  
“[O]ne cannot be expected to tolerate a clearly defined threat to who one is, 
to one’s identity.”62  Discriminatory regulations controlling marriage are 
vitally important to both the Coptic and Muslim communities precisely 
because these regulations ensure that religious boundaries are clearly 
defined and rigorously observed.63  As Adam Seligman observes,  
[G]roups have boundaries, and cannot exist without these 
boundaries.  One cannot make claims to any type of identity 
without that identity being defined, which in some senses involves 
it being bounded and circumscribed as well.  To ask a group to 
tolerate what threatens that identity is to ask the group to dismantle 
itself—to make itself cease to be.64 
Thus, the most fundamental function of marriage in both the Coptic and 
Muslim communities in Egypt is to assert and to sustain the boundaries that 
preserve the respective religious identities, using discriminatory measures 
when necessary.65   
Conversely, the discussion surrounding modern notions of religious 
freedom calls for tolerance and condemns discrimination.66  The nature of 
this freedom is very different from the religious freedom afforded by the 
Muslims to minorities discussed above.  The tolerance advocated in the 
modern era is not premised upon separate spheres of existence but is instead 
rooted in inclusion and openness.  This discussion around religious 
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freedom, arising from a concern for the rights of religious minorities, 
attempts to promote their welfare by eradicating discriminatory measures 
based on religion.  In some areas such as political participation, the minority 
is severely disadvantaged by its exclusion from this domain.  Accordingly, 
the promise of religious freedom coupled with protection from 
discrimination clearly advances the political position of the minority in its 
respective society.  However, in other areas where religion is implicated, 
such as marriage, the desire for religious freedom is muted because the 
benefits are not so apparent. 
In relation to marriage in Egypt, the public/private distinction is central to 
creating and maintaining religious boundaries.  Marriage can act as the most 
effective preserver of religious identity because of its traditional place in the 
private realm, where it is accountable only to religious laws and not national 
regulation.67  Because of their private position in Egyptian society, marriage 
laws can be discriminatory in their effort to perpetuate religious heritage.68 
As I have explained, both Copts and Muslims discriminate against the 
other to remain distinct and to ensure each group’s cohesive continuity over 
time.69  The two religious communities live in a society in which 
discrimination in the area of marriage is a shared and mutually honored 
value.  If they choose to eradicate discriminatory measures in marriage, 
each necessarily exposes its respective religious sphere to an “other,” 
signaling the demise of both of the adherents’ religious identities as they 
know them.       
A crisis erupts when national law and international values promoting 
religious tolerance and freedom from discrimination intrude upon the 
zealously guarded province of religious identity, as they do in the case of 
marriage in Egypt.  This intrusion is complicated and conflicted.  Both 
Muslims and Copts have a strong impulse to erect communal boundaries in 
order to defend their religious identities.  However, they also experience a 
countervailing and persuasive inclination to transgress their boundaries and 
redefine their religions according to the changes affecting the world outside 
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their communities.70  The result is that the walls that encase their religious 
identities can be very tenuous at times.   
Generally, these walls constitute the margins of these religious groups.  
And it is at the walls, rather than at the nucleus, that most struggles occur; 
Muslims and Copts reconstruct and redraw lines without infringing upon 
their communities’ core values and underpinning beliefs.  However, a 
redefinition of marriage does not transpire at the edge of the religious 
boundaries but trespasses into the very heart of the religion.      
B.  Egyptian Law 
Marriage laws in Egypt belong to the corpus of personal status laws, or 
“family law.”71  For the most part, Copts and Muslims have been free to 
control marriage in accordance with their own laws because family law was 
left relatively untouched by colonial efforts and was relatively unaffected by 
subsequent national legislation.72     
Historically, conservative Muslims and Muslim religious leaders were 
keen to see the personal status rules of the Shari‘a retained.  In fact, they 
have largely succeeded.73  Because Egypt has crafted its marriage laws 
around the legacy of the Shari‘a, the Egyptian government has refrained 
from enacting uniform national legislation in matters such as divorce, child 
custody, and marriage; it has been very clear which personal status laws 
apply to which religious group.74  Because the Shari‘a laws affecting these 
matters require non-Muslim–Muslim distinctions, it makes sense that so 
long as the Shari‘a is upheld, the Copts will be governed by the laws of 
their own religion in matters of personal status.75     
With respect to marriage, the Shari‘a allows Muslim men to marry non-
Muslim women but prohibits Muslim women from marrying non-Muslim 
men.76  Muslims justify this law by pointing to the historical legal inequality 
between Muslims and non-Muslims.  Ann Mayer explains the 
rationalization of the historical inequality: 
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The assumption is that, just as Muslims are placed above non-
Muslims, so men are placed above women, meaning that wives are 
necessarily subordinated to their husbands.  Therefore, the Muslim 
man who marries a female dhimmi [non-Muslim] does not infringe 
the hierarchy of status, since by virtue of her sex the non-Muslim 
wife will be subordinate to her husband, who as a Muslim and a 
male ranks above her on two counts.  In contrast, the Muslim 
woman who marries a dhimmi violates the rules of status, since as 
a wife she has lower status than the man to whom she is married 
even though by virtue of her adherence to the Islamic religion she 
should rank above him.77 
While the prohibition explicitly outlaws a marriage between a Muslim 
woman and non-Muslim man, in practice the prohibition is also applied to 
Muslim men and non-Muslim women.78   
The corpus of law promulgated by the Coptic Church is the Coptic canon 
law, which also places restrictions upon its Coptic adherents.  A Coptic 
woman who marries a Muslim man is excommunicated, and a Muslim 
woman who wishes to marry a Coptic man must convert in order for the 
marriage to be recognized within the Coptic Church.79  In practice, a 
Muslim man or woman who converts to Christianity could be charged with 
apostasy (abandonment of Islam) by his or her fellow Muslims and could 
suffer legal consequences.80  In many cases, one’s family would abandon 
such a person.  In essence, the Coptic and Muslim restrictions upon 
marriage work well together to legally and effectively prevent any desire or 
reality of a Copt-Muslim marriage.  In Egypt, the laws of marriage as 
erected by religion discriminate against Muslim–non-Muslim alliances out 
of a perceived superiority on the part of Muslims, a coveted insularity on 
the part of the Copts, and an effort to forestall a completely objectionable 
mixing of the religions by both sides.  
 The relegation of family law to Egypt’s respective religious communities 
has not left it entirely independent of state intrusion and influence.  Since 
the late 1920s and more dramatically since the 1970s, the Egyptian state has 
nominally legislated in certain areas of the family law.  For example, Egypt 
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most recently amended the Personal Status Law on January 27, 2000, to 
create a minimum age requirement for marriage, marriage guardianship 
regulations, and to lift certain divorce restrictions.81   
There is also an interesting dynamic between the courts and the 
legislature in the matter of hisba suits.  Hisba is a doctrine that entitles any 
Muslim to take legal action against anyone or anything that he or she 
considers to be harmful to Islam.82  On June 14, 1995, a Cairo appeals court 
for personal status litigation ruled that Dr. Nasr Hamed Abu Zeid, a 
professor at Cairo University, must be separated from his wife.83  A few 
individuals accused the professor of writing opinions that rejected some 
fundamental tenets of Islam and filed suit on the grounds that his Muslim 
wife could not be married to an apostate.84  After the court issued the much-
publicized decision, Abu Zeid and his wife were forced to travel with 
guards at all times because they feared violent attacks on their lives.85  
Finally, Dr. Abu Zeid and his wife decided to leave “the siege” in Egypt 
and resettled in the Netherlands.86 
In the aftermath of the contentious ruling in Abu Zeid’s case, the 
Egyptian government asked parliament to amend the hisba law, allowing 
only the prosecutor-general to file such cases after receiving complaints 
from individuals, thereby preventing claims by private individuals.  
Parliament granted the request and passed Law No. 3/1996.87  Despite 
passage of the law, the hisba suits did not stop and another highly 
publicized trial followed in 2001.  A lawyer took the controversial Muslim 
writer and feminist Nawal el-Saadawi to court claiming that she insulted 
Islam, was an apostate, and could no longer remain married to her 
husband.88  This time, the Personal Status Court rejected the lawsuit and 
ruled, in accordance with the amended hisba law, that the lawyer had 
overstepped his legal boundaries in his attempt to divorce Saadawi from her 
husband and reaffirmed that only the prosecutor-general could file such 
claims.89  While this was a step forward, the hisba law still legally exists, 
albeit in narrowed application.90  The intersection between law, society, and 
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government as it concretely affects the marriage of two people in 
contemporary Egyptian society is brought to life in these cases.                       
Finally, the relationship between the family laws of both religions and 
Egypt’s Constitution has its own contradictions and difficulties.  The 
marriage laws promulgated by both Copts and Muslims discriminate against 
all outside religions while Egypt’s Constitution provides for equal public 
rights and duties without discrimination of religion or creed.91  The 
Constitution declares that “the State shall guarantee the freedom of belief 
and the freedom of practice of religious rights.”92  Thus, there is an uneasy 
balance between the nondiscriminatory code in the public domain, which is 
subject to national legislation, and the discriminatory religious freedom in 
the private realm.93 
C.  International Law and the Antidiscrimination Momentum 
Today’s nations are not only subject to international law but are greatly 
influenced and necessarily responsive to international declarations, 
decisions, and the values that underpin the public exhortations of the 
international law-making community.  As a participant in the international 
community, Egypt is legally accountable to certain international human 
rights instruments and is also heavily influenced by the general human 
rights atmosphere.94   
The protection of religious freedom and religious minorities from 
persecution and discrimination is a primary and enduring concern for the 
drafters of international human rights declarations and resolutions.95  The 
ideals of freedom of religion and nondiscrimination based on religion find 
themselves at an interesting intersection in Egypt.   
The international documents advocating for religious freedom promote 
what Egypt seems to already provide its citizens.  For example, Article 18 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the foundational 
document in international human rights law, secures “the right to freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion.”96  Article 18 of the International 
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also protects freedom of 
religion and explicitly allows for conversion (of one’s religion to another) 
without impairment.  The ICCPR also provides for a liberal capacity to 
publicly manifest one’s religion “in worship, observance, practice, and 
teaching.”97  Egypt does not deny these guarantees of religious freedom; in 
fact, Egypt affords Copts their space to practice and believe as they desire—
as long as their practices do not infringe upon the Muslim community.98  
Thus, Egypt respects the religious freedom of both its Muslim and Coptic 
populations.   
International human rights documents move beyond a surface assurance 
of religious freedom in one’s national territory and recognize special rights 
for religious minorities.  In many ways, the nature of these rights accords 
with Egypt’s social divisions and the separation of its religious 
communities.  For example, the UN’s Declaration on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, or Linguistic Minorities (the 
Declaration) protects and promotes the minority’s independent identity, 
allowing for a generous degree of autonomy from the majority 
populations.99  The Declaration promises religious minorities the “right to 
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use 
their own language, in private and in public”100 as well as “the right to 
establish and maintain their own associations.”101  On its face, Egypt seems 
to grant the Copts their right to maintain and develop their internal religious 
identity and culture free from external interference.   
The companion principle to freedom of religion, however, is the right to 
be free from religious discrimination.  It is here that the international 
requirements of religious freedom and Egypt’s compliance with them 
encounter difficulty.  As we have seen, both the Copts and Muslims in 
Egypt practice discriminatory measures premised upon religion and 
evidenced in their marriage laws by excluding cross-religious unions.  In 
affording both religions their “religious freedom,” the religions freely 
discriminate.   
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The practice of religious discrimination perpetrated by both the Copts 
and the Muslims against each other and enforced by national legislation, 
clearly does not correspond with the international prohibition of religious 
discrimination.  Conversely, the international human rights standards 
promoting nondiscrimination intrude upon the province of religious 
freedom.  If discrimination is perpetuated in the practice of one’s own 
religious freedom, that feature of the freedom can be circumscribed.102  The 
UDHR103 and the ICCPR clearly prohibit any discrimination in the law 
based on religion,104 and the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief 
further articulates the principle that “[n]o one shall be subject to 
discrimination by any State, institution, group of persons, or person on the 
grounds of religion or other belief.”105     
Most of the documents addressing religious discrimination do not 
specifically speak to marriage.  The lack of discussion regarding marriage is 
the result of the intensely personal nature of the marital interest and the 
reluctance of the international community to legislate in the personal 
sphere.  Only the UDHR ventures a note about discrimination when it 
comes to marriage:  “Men and women of full age, without any limitation 
due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a 
family.  They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage 
and at its dissolution.”106  The UDHR deposits the rights surrounding 
marriage into the hands of the individuals involved rather than their 
religious communities.  The two positions, then, appear irreconcilable. 
III.  PROSPECTS FOR RECONCILIATION 
The arrangement of marriage in Egyptian society poses a barrier to those 
who no longer believe in discriminating against one’s religious neighbors in 
the most intimate sphere of existence and finds itself precariously 
navigating between the rights of religious freedom and nondiscrimination.  
Relegating marriage laws to the private sphere where marriage is regulated 
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by religious prescriptions and bolstered by an unyielding conviction that 
religious integration leads to the corruption of the community’s religious 
identity issues a daunting impediment to refashioning the perspective 
encircling marriage in Egypt.  Even so, Egyptian society is slowly but 
surely inching closer to an inevitable conclusion: the laws prohibiting Copt-
Muslim marriage will have to change.  The question at this stage is what is 
the best course for Egypt to assume? 
A.  Challenges  
There are a number of challenges that must be faced and properly 
resolved in order for all of the necessary parts of Egyptian society to work 
together in an effort to erase religious discrimination from the marriage 
table.  The overarching issue is that of identity.  Effectively, the eradication 
of all of Egypt’s discriminatory marriage regulations asks Copts and 
Muslims alike to favor national laws that draw upon international values 
above religious laws that depend upon the tradition and history of the 
community.  The most salient problem of choosing between national and 
religious identity is the fear that in choosing the former, the latter will be 
comprised.  In other words, it is presumed that the two identities are 
antithetical to one another and endanger the existence of the other.  Personal 
beliefs, family, history, authority, and familiarity or territorial affiliation, 
modernization, liberalism, international legitimacy, and change convolute 
the choice for both the individual and society.  Religion will prevail and 
personal conviction will compel the individual’s choice, and if it does not, 
social and familial pressure will.  Marriage carries a heavy implication that 
to tinker with its formulation is to jeopardize the continuance of the 
religious community.  
Associated with the national-religious choice is an internal/external 
debate.  In the case of Egypt, a national predilection is regarded with some 
degree of suspicion because it does not spring from either of the indigenous 
religious communities.  The notion of the nation-state is entirely foreign to 
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the religious ordering that Egypt subscribed to prior to a very bitterly 
remembered imperialist colonial effort.  Religious communities regard the 
idea of national laws, independent of religious persuasion, as an imposition 
from the outside.  The connection between the nation-state and international 
legal standards only enhances the indigenous religious community’s 
alienation from those external and entirely unfamiliar laws.  Conversely, 
laws predicated upon religion are internally generated and considered 
legitimate and authoritative.  
In effecting change, it is important to consider the willingness of the 
parties involved to engage in a social, legal, and religious transformation.  
Do both Copts and Muslims genuinely want a modification in the laws of 
marriage in their country?  If they do, what is the nature of that desire, and 
how do they intend to act upon its realization?  For example, like Layla and 
Karim, certain parts of both the Coptic and Muslim communities (the 
younger generation of the privileged classes) do want the freedom to marry 
across religious lines.  That aspiration, however, is riddled with conflict due 
in large part to the older generation’s condemnation.  If the discord is 
exceptionally (or even less) intimidating, then the prospects for either side 
to initiate change may be thwarted; it may be easier to avoid a seemingly 
unassailable, much less unapproachable, dilemma than to bravely weather 
the penalties of one’s daring. 
The readiness of individual Copts and Muslims to create change must be 
assessed by the social climate.  The individuals calling for change may not 
be representative of the larger community, which may also have a greater 
momentum for stasis than for revolution.  The change ordered must not 
venture too far or too quickly lest it trigger a vehement opposition capable 
of snuffing the initial spark.107  Concrete and substantive social, legal, and 
religious transformation may safely proceed only when built upon a solid 
foundation.  Without an appraisal of the readiness of the society, the effort 
by willing Copts and Muslims may fail or walk a precipice of uncertainty 
and instability.      
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B.  Change—Religious or Legal? 
Insight and appreciation of the matter itself is indispensable to unraveling 
the intricacies of marriage laws in Egypt and creating change.  The first step 
is to determine and define the playing field and to query where and how the 
proposed change will take place.  Marriage resides in both the legal and 
religious provinces and can be affected by substantive alterations in either 
sphere.  Whether to undertake a legal solution or a religious solution is 
perhaps the most salient decision to be made. 
The paths are not entirely disengaged; rather, religion and law must 
cooperate and collaborate if meaningful evolution of a contentious issue is 
to occur.  In Egypt, where law and religion have been and continue to be so 
closely aligned and interrelated, to divorce one from the other would be 
unnatural and debilitating.  In order to cultivate the optimal working 
relationship between the legal and the religious spheres, society must 
delineate the respective legal and religious roles and responsibilities.  
Society must also be sensitive to the particular needs of the country 
involved.  Although the larger issue is one of legal reform in discriminatory 
marriage laws, it is imperative to approach the marriage issue with an 
Egyptian-oriented solution as the objective.   
Even though religion and law are closely interrelated, change must begin 
with religion rather than law.  Immediate legal reform will not move 
religion to harmonize itself with the law.  In fact, if the government was to 
remove family law from its religious domain and was to strike the 
discriminatory elements, it is likely that such a step would be entirely 
cosmetic and largely ignored in practice.  Legal reform alone would provide 
little conviction and no buttressing foundation for change.  The inherent 
problem faced by many Copts and Muslims like Layla and Karim of 
refraining from marrying the person one wants to be with—regardless of 
religious affiliation—would still exist because the religious communities 
would continue to instill the discriminatory principle and would more 
directly enforce it than the law’s newly fashioned matrimonial liberty. 
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The fundamental place of religion in Egyptian society necessarily leads 
to the conclusion that change must occur within the religion.  A change in 
religion will subsequently lead to a call, issued from the religious 
communities themselves, for legal modification of marriage laws reflecting 
the religious reformation.  Not only will the change be authentic, sincere, 
and deeply rooted in both the belief and practice of the religious 
communities, but it will also peacefully accord with national and 
international legislation.  Neither national nor international legislation will 
be compromised or hindered.  The law must encourage and must be open to 
the transformation of belief.  The legal system ought not stifle the 
restructuring of religious beliefs; instead, it should provide an opportunity 
for the law to represent the new, religious determination.108   
In Egypt, the national legislation should not prohibit the revision of 
marriage laws that freely permit Copt-Muslim unions.  Likewise, it should 
not thwart modernity and cultural, social, and religious change.  If Muslims, 
for example, were to move away from discrimination, but the Copts were to 
refrain from such movement, the government of Egypt should use its 
resources to enforce the tolerant Muslim posture rather than promote the 
discriminatory Coptic stance.  The national legal system must make it 
difficult for the religious communities to persist in their discrimination. 
C.  A Regime of Tolerance 
The most crucial step in ending discriminatory marriage practices in 
Egypt is inviting a regime of tolerance into the belief systems of both 
religious communities.  Assigning the law to its rightful place as a promoter 
of positive change emanating within the religion, as opposed to viewing the 
law as a sluggish defender of a negative religious status quo, raises a 
pressing question:  What needs to happen to counsel a reformation in the 
religious community’s values, beliefs, and perceptions?  The answer is that 
Egypt must first determine whether the religious values are out of balance 
with the practice of the individuals.  In Egypt, it appears that both Muslims 
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and Copts are moving in a direction that is not in peaceful balance with the 
religious dictates.  The younger generation, as evinced by the relationship 
between Layla and Karim, is timidly questioning what was once the 
unquestionable.  Egypt must also determine whether the religious values in 
its religious communities are valid in relation to the larger international 
community.  Egypt must recognize that the concerns and fears about losing 
religious identity do not justify retreating from the issue of discrimination in 
marriage.  If discrimination is removed from their marriage laws, both 
Copts and Muslims are right to fear that their respective religious identities 
will not survive in their present form.  The loss of insulated and 
endogamous religious identities does not justify the maintenance of a 
sociolegal scheme that prevents religious intermarriage.  The belief systems 
of both religious communities must promote a regime of tolerance and 
understanding. 
If marriage were perceived as a positive part of an acceptable reformation 
of their religious identities, Muslims and Copts could accommodate the 
prospect of amalgamation rather than decry it as corruption of religious 
identity.  A solid adherence to tolerance would allow for such to happen.  In 
other words, Muslims and Copts would need to accept and tolerate each 
other at the most intimate level.  In order to do this, both groups must 
conceive of such tolerance of the other and welcome and regard the new 
possibility of interaction as a positive contribution to the religious identities, 
a contribution that enriches their lives.  Both communities would need to 
embrace the value of tolerance in order to annul the value of discrimination, 
as it is inherently intolerant. 
In order to arrive at and to welcome the value of tolerance, the Copts and 
Muslims need to reassess the thick boundaries that they have erected 
throughout the centuries of their coexistence.109  While the boundaries were 
vital in a society entirely ordered by religion, they are now anachronistic.  
The modern world establishes and promotes interaction that crosses all 
boundaries, barriers, lines, and blockades.  It is a reality that engenders a 
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belief in absolute respect and tolerance for one another.  Therefore, while I 
cannot in this article offer a substantive framework or process by which 
Muslims and Copts can proactively begin their necessary paths towards 
tolerance, I do advocate for the continued openness to new ideas and 
experiences that has already begun.  External influences and experiences 
have encouraged the first tentative line of questioning.  Having opened this 
door, I do not believe that it will be closed. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Muslim-Copt relationship in Egypt today is informed by a long 
history of religious identification.  Both religious communities discriminate 
against the other as a way of preserving their religious heritage.  This is 
nowhere more apparent and poignant than in the laws of marriage, where 
cross-religious unions are prohibited by each religion and are fortified 
through national deference to religion.  While the younger individuals of 
both faiths in Egyptian society rarely challenge this guarded law in a blatant 
manner, the inability to marry someone of the other religion is no longer 
comfortably accepted.  The story of Layla and Karim attests to this 
emerging discomfort, if not quiet rebellion, that is slowly bleeding into the 
Coptic-Muslim romantic relations of today. 
In order for these laws to change and to reflect more national and 
international standards, a genuine reformation in religious thought must 
precede its legal extinction.  Copts and Muslims need to allow their 
boundaries to fall in favor of shaping their religious identity into a model of 
overarching tolerance of each other.  The society in which Layla and Karim 
live has not yet arrived at this moment, but their hesitant steps forward 
certainly indicate that some of Egyptian society may be moving ever closer 
to embracing the value of tolerance.  As this unfolds, more stories like 
Layla and Karim’s will be recounted, but the narrators will tell of different 
endings. 
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enactment.  See Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, The Contingent Universality of Human Rights: 
The Case of Freedom of Expression in African and Islamic Contexts, 11 EMORY INT’L L. 
REV. 29 (1997).  Furthermore, recall that the institutions of international organization and 
enforcement were being formulated while a vast majority of nations could not contribute 
to this process.  They were suffering under repressive colonialist rule by the very same 
European powers that were proclaiming the Universal Declaration of Human Rights at 
the United Nations. 
50 Mayer, Islam and the State, supra note 19, at 1026–27. 
51 Id. at 1016. 
52 For example, Egypt is a party to a number of international instruments.  See Status of 
Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties as of 09 June 2004, 
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2005) [hereinafter Status of 
Ratifications].  Egypt has also often taken the lead in Middle Eastern peace talks, acting 
as a mediator between divisive factions as well as between the Middle East and the West.  
See Re-Popularising Peace, AL-AHRAM, Dec. 2–8, 2004, available at 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/719/eg6.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2005). 
53 These human rights standards have weathered storms of criticism over their purported 
universality.  However, a common argument for their preservation is that they are 
universally valid because they reflect the normative framework of a common human 
experience reflected in the realities of globalization and expanding state power occurring 
in every part of the world today.  See Abdullahi An-Na’im, Human Rights in the Muslim 
World: Socio-Political Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13 
(1990). 
54 Tanya Kramer, Note, The Controversy of a Palestinian “Right of Return” to Israel, 18 
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 979, 1002 (2001).  In discussing the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, Kramer notes that while the document as a United Nations General 
Assembly resolution has no legally binding effect, it represents “principles reflective of 
customary international law” and has, therefore, become binding upon all countries.  Id. 
at 1007. 
55 Egypt is one of the oldest members of the United Nations (since Oct. 24, 1945) and 
has either signed and/or ratified a rather significant number of the many treaties, 
resolutions, and other international legal documents.  See Status of Ratifications, supra 
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note 52.  This is a strong indication of Egypt’s active and agreeable presence in the 
international community. 
56 This issue is particularly poignant for Muslims because of the utterly alien nature of 
such a proposition.  As Ann Mayer asserts, “Indeed, at the risk of some 
overgeneralization, one might assert that in the premodern Muslim world there was no 
concept of a secular law in the sense of a law produced by human agency that could 
conflict with, much less override, the precepts of Islam.”  Mayer, Islam and the State, 
supra note 19, at 1023. 
57 The existence of a national constitution and nationally legislated laws applicable to all 
citizens of Egypt obviates a separate Coptic legal system outside of the purely religious 
(i.e. church business). 
58 This is experienced through the maintenance of a degree of separateness 
(communities, schools, social interactions, marriage), the reluctance to include Copts in 
positions of authority, and the continued violence between the two groups.  See supra 
Part I.A.2. 
59 Id. 
60 I specifically note the nineteenth century because of the role colonization played in 
imposing foreign influences upon indigenous cultures.  In reference to proselytism, Tad 
Stahnke remarks, “Religious change has historically gone hand in hand with international 
exploration, conquest and colonization, and the resulting political re-alignments.”  See 
Tad Stahnke, Proselytism and the Freedom to Change Religion in International Human 
Rights Law, 1999 BYU L. REV. 251, 300 (1999). 
61 The obvious association with marriage is procreation.  As women bear the future 
adherents of a religion, they are disproportionately burdened by religious laws/traditions 
surrounding marriage.  As Ayelet Shachar notes, “First, religious traditions often encode 
within their legal traditions various formal and informal mechanisms for controlling the 
personal status and sexuality of women, primarily because women play a central and 
potentially powerful role in symbolically reproducing the collective.”  Ayelet Shachar, 
The Puzzle of Interlocking Power Hierarchies: Sharing the Pieces of Jurisdictional 
Authority, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385, 397 (2000). 
62 Adam B. Seligman, Tolerance, Tradition, and Modernity, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1645, 
1652 (2003). 
63 Shachar states that 
[t]raditionally, various religious (and national) communities have used 
marriage and divorce regulation in the same way that modern states have used 
citizenship law: to delineate clearly who is inside and who is outside of the 
collective.  Family law fulfills this demarcating function by legally defining 
only certain kinds of marriage and sexual reproduction as legitimate, while 
labeling all others as illegitimate.  By punishing individuals who engage in 
“illegitimate” marriage and childbirth, certain minority groups (as well as 
various states) use marriage and divorce regulations as a sociopolitical tool for 
policing a given collective’s membership boundaries. 
Shachar, supra note 61, at 394. 
64 Seligman, supra note 62, at 1652; see also Shachar, supra note 61, at 395. 
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65 Shachar posits that the arena of family law is so volatile because of the underlying 
philosophical questions that it brings to the surface.  One of these issues, the degree to 
which the state may define the family, directly confronts minority communities’ 
increasing demand for legal recognition of family law traditions “as necessary to preserve 
the group’s collective identities.” Shachar, supra note 61, at 394. 
66 There is a rich body of international instruments that are of this persuasion, including 
the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination 
based on Religion or Belief, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  See infra notes 96–99, 105. 
67 See Mayer, Islam and the State, supra note 19, at 1027. 
68 Seligman comments about the power of the public/private distinction in discussions 
surrounding tolerance.  If beliefs and/or practices are deemed private, they are “beyond 
the realm of what even enters a calculus of tolerance. . . . For one has no right to 
intervene in private matters, or even to judge them.”  Seligman, supra note 62, at 1649. 
69 See supra Part I.A.2. 
70 Madhavi Sunder proposes that religious communities are  
constantly evolving over time through internal debate and interaction with 
outsiders.  And this has never been so true as in the twenty-first century.  
Individuals in the modern world increasingly demand change within their 
religious communities in order to bring their faith in line with democratic 
norms and practices. . . . Today, individuals seek reason, equality, and liberty 
not just in the public sphere, but in the private spheres of religion, culture, and 
family. 
Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 1403 (2003). 
71 See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Dept. of State, 
Egypt: International Religious Freedom Report, Sept. 15, 2004, 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2004/35496.htm [hereinafter U.S. Dept. of State 2004]. 
72 See RON SHAHAM, FAMILY AND THE COURTS IN MODERN EGYPT: A STUDY BASED ON 
DECISIONS BY THE SHARI‘A COURTS 1900–1955, at 1–23 (1997); ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW 
IN A CHANGING WORLD: A GLOBAL RESOURCE BOOK 171 (Abdullahi A. An-Na’im ed., 
2002) [hereinafter GLOBAL RESOURCE BOOK]; Mayer, Islam and the State, supra note 
19, at 1027. 
73 There are three possible explanations for their success: (1) the Qur’an devotes much 
more space to questions of family law than other legal issues, making these laws closely 
tied with the Divine Revelation; (2) perhaps as a result of the surplus of revelation in this 
area, these rules were most highly elaborated by the Muslim jurists; and (3) the personal 
status rules support the institutions of a patriarchal family, preserving a central, if 
endangered, institution in traditional Muslim societies.  Mayer, Islam and the State, supra 
note 19, at 1027. 
74 See U.S. Dept. of State 2004, supra note 71; GLOBAL RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 
72, at 171. 
75 Mayer, Islam and the State, supra note 19, at 1027. 
76 ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA’IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL 
LIBERTIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 176 (1990). 
77 ANN ELIZABETH MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 139 (3d ed. 1991). 
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78 This practice finds both textual and historical legal support.  The Qur’anic verse 2:221 
advises against both men and women marrying non-Muslims.  El Alami qualifies the 
permission for a Muslim man to marry a non-Muslim woman by citing three of the four 
Islamic jurisprudential schools: the Hanifis, the Malikis, and the Shafi’is all validate the 
contract but consider it reprehensible and inadvisable, while the Hanbalis regard it as 
permissible.  DAWOUD SUDQUI EL ALAMI, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT IN ISLAMIC LAW 
IN THE SHARI’AH AND PERSONAL STATUS LAWS OF EGYPT AND MOROCCO 41–42 
(1992).  Finally, Judith Tucker explains that the Muslim jurists  
were very conscious of the rules of kafa’a, the legal concept of the suitability 
of the match in terms of lineage, legal status, social class, and moral standards, 
and they chose to enforce them.  If a marriage were to reinforce social 
harmony, it was important to avoid the instability attendant upon misalliance . . 
. . Clearly, the interests of the community would not be served by marriages 
that appeared to be inherently unstable because of the disparate backgrounds of 
the bride and groom.   
JUDITH TUCKER, IN THE HOUSE OF THE LAW: GENDER AND ISLAMIC LAW IN OTTOMAN 
SYRIA AND PALESTINE 41 (1998). 
79 U.S. Dept. of State 2002, supra note 5. 
80 See infra p. 687 (discussing hisba lawsuits). 
81 More explicitly, Egypt has established a legal marriage age (eighteen for males, 
sixteen for females), legislated in the area of marriage guardianship regulations (a 
person’s legal guardian cannot prevent his ward from marrying for reasons of status, 
amount of dower, etc.), lifted the divorce restrictions for women, and changed laws in the 
area of inheritance.  See GLOBAL RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 72, at 171. 
82 See Nadia Abou el-Magd, When the Professor Can’t Teach, AL-AHRAM WKLY., June 
15–21, available at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2000/486/eg6.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 
2005). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 In an article in al-Ahram, Abu Zeid said, “When some of our neighbours asked our 
guards why they were with us, they responded, ‘because of the kafir [the infidel].’”  Id. 
86 Id. 
87 See GLOBAL RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 72, at 171. 
88 See Dalia Dabbous, I Pronounce You Still Man and Wife: Nawal el-Saadawi’s 
Involuntary Divorce Proceedings Come to an End, 5 CAIRO TIMES 22 (Aug. 2–8, 2001), 
http://www.nawalsaadawi.net/press/CT-8August.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2005). 
89 Id. 
90 Saadawi intends to work for the eradication of the hisba law altogether.  Conversely, 
the lawyer who brought suit against her is working to have the 1996 amendment 
cancelled, calling it unconstitutional because it contravenes the Shari‘a, which according 
to the Egyptian Constitution is the main source of legislation.  See id. 
91 EGYPTIAN CONST., pt. III, art. 40. 
92 Matthew L. Sandgren, Comment, Extending Religious Freedoms Abroad: Difficulties 
Experienced by Minority Religions, 9 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 251, 275 (2001) 
(quoting EGYPTIAN CONST., pt. III, art. 40 (1980)). 
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93 This is further complicated by the 1980 amendment to the Constitution that reads that 
“the principles of Islamic Shari’a will be the [prior to the amendment it read “a”] main 
source of legislation.”  EGYPTIAN CONST., pt. III, art. 40 (1980).  This national nod to 
Islamic law calls into question principles of equality on a much broader scale in Egyptian 
law and society.  See An-Na’im, Religious Freedom in Egypt, supra note 13. 
94 Generally, Egypt has had a long history of very favorable relations with the 
international human rights community and a positive association with the United Nations.  
Moreover, Egypt is a signatory to the International Bill of Rights (the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).  Therefore, 
not only is Egypt legally bound by these documents, but Egypt also accedes to the weight 
of their moral authority on the subject.  See Brown, supra note 3, at 1063–68. 
95 International law currently recognizes the right to freedom of religion and prohibition 
of religious discrimination as two of the twelve core rights that cannot be violated under 
any circumstances and are binding upon all states, whether the states are signatories to a 
particular convention or not (they are considered principles of customary international 
law).  See Tayyab Mahmud, Freedom of Religion and Religious Minorities in Pakistan: A 
Study of Judicial Practice, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 40, 91(1995). 
96 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(a)(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
97 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 18, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, 178 S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
98 Id. 
99 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or 
Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 210, 
U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (1993) [hereinafter Declaration on the Rights of Persons]. 
100 Id. at art. 2.  Article 27 of the ICCPR contains a similar guarantee.  However, it is 
generally agreed that the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities has superseded it.  See Nathan Lerner, The 
Nature and Minimum Standards of Freedom of Religion or Belief, 2000 BYU L. REV. 
905, 917 (2000). 
101 Declaration on the Rights of Persons, supra note 99, at art. 2. 
102 Lerner postulates that, according to the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, not all preference based on 
religion or belief is discriminatory: “For example, comparative legislation on religious 
rights sometimes prefers religions, treats religions differently, and draws distinctions 
between religions that respond to social and historic realities. . . . Common sense is the 
key.”  Lerner, supra note 100, at 920.  I suggest that because the discrimination in the 
case of Egypt is premised upon notions of superiority, distrust, and unequal separation, it 
is not a valid exercise of discriminatory laws. 
103 UDHR, supra note 96, at art. 7. 
104 ICCPR, supra note 97, at art. 26. 
105 Declaration of the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination 
Based on Religion or Belief, art. 2, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR 36th Sess., Agenda 
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Item 75, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/55 (1981) [hereinafter Declaration of the Elimination of 
All Forms of Intolerance].  Article 3 is even stronger in its denunciation: 
Discrimination between human beings on the grounds of religion or belief 
constitutes an affront to human dignity and a disavowal of the principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations and shall be condemned as a violation of the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and enunciated in detail in the International 
Covenants on Human Rights, and as an obstacle to friendly and peaceful 
relations between nations. 
Finally, Article 4 calls upon states to “make all efforts to enact or rescind legislation 
where necessary to prohibit any such discrimination and to take all appropriate measures 
to combat intolerance on the grounds of religion or other beliefs in this matter.” 
106 UDHR, supra note 96, at art. 16.  
107 In the United States, Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg considered the 
question of society’s readiness for change in the case of abortion.  Justice Ginsburg 
posited that the Court’s decision to legalize abortion sparked a public opposition that still 
rages today because the Court “ventured too far in the change it ordered and presented an 
incomplete justification for its action.” See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on 
Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 376 (1985).  
There was no solid foundation on which the Court rested its decision and because of its 
insensitivity to the social climate, the nature of the Roe v. Wade decision divided the 
country, rather than quieted it.  Today, a similar socio-legal debate is happening in the 
United States over same-sex marriage and some are concerned that the legal system is 
moving too far too fast.  For an appraisal of the “fits and starts” of progression toward the 
legalization of same-sex marriage, see Inching Down the Aisle: Differing Paths Toward 
the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage in the United States and Europe, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 2004 (2003). 
108 This view of the law accommodating religious change is the other side of the notion 
that law ought to regard religion as completely separate and untouchable.  The latter, a 
discourse where law conceives of religion as “the other,” can actually function to 
preserve distasteful aspects of religion.  In this discourse, law defers to religion and 
regards it as natural, irrational, incontestable, and imposed.  As Sunder explains, 
In short, religion’s conceptualization as law’s other not only helps to confine 
religion but also to defend it.  The Enlightenment rendered religion immutable 
and without need for justification or legitimacy—religion cannot be defended 
against irrationality because irrationality is thought to be its essence.  
Heterogeneity and critical discourses within religion are subverted in favor of 
the imposed views of religious leaders.  Religion is studied and preserved as a 
fixed, unchanging object rather than as an ever-shifting, subjective construct. 
Sunder, supra note 70, at 1424. 
109 In his discussion of a liberal foundation of tolerance, Seligman advances the idea that 
modern societies . . . do not so much make societies more tolerant, but rather 
do away with group boundaries . . . . Within the public sphere, boundaries are, 
in these societies, parsed into razor thin edges; individuals interact not as 
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members of groups, but as bearers of rights. . . . In the public sphere, group 
identities have been replaced by the legal recognition and entitlement of rights. 
Seligman, supra note 62, at 1653.  However, he later notes that while modern societies 
within the confines of the nation-state seem to elide the problem of tolerance, he believes 
that this is not sufficient and that “we will have to reinvent the language of tolerance . . . . 
To do so, I believe we will need to have recourse to religious foundations for tolerance . . 
. .”  Id. at 1656. 
